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FORECLOSURE AND SALE
Some Suggested Changes in the New York Procedure
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, JR.
The iniquitous character of one who forecloses a mortgage is firmly fixed
in the minds of many. I can recall no story in which the hero is a
mortagee, but the worthy debtor who is ousted from his old homestead by
foreclosure is a familiar literary figure.1 Undoubtedly the idea that creditors
often seek to get valuable property for an inadequate price by foreclosing
mortgages has had much influence on popular thought, and our legal pro-
cedure has been shaped accordingly. The requirement of the New York
Civil Practice Act that in every action to foreclose a mortgage the judgment
must direct a public auction of the mortgaged lands2 is obviously designed to
protect the debtor by guaranteeing to him the true value of his equity. This
paper gives the results of some inquiry as to the real worth of this procedure,
and is intended to suggest that in always requiring a sale we have possibly
been governed more by sentiment than by reality.
Two provisions of New York law give special protection to the defendants
in a foreclosure action. First, no judgment of foreclosure can be entered
merely on the defendants' default: the amount of the debt must be determined
by a computation which may be made by the court, but which as a general
rule is made by a referee appointed for the purpose.3 Next, when the extent
of the debt is so determined and the plaintiff becomes entitled to a judgment,
it must direct that the property (or enough of it to satisfy the debt) be sold.4
The sale must.be at public auction 5 after six weeks of newspaper advertising
in small communities6 and three weeks in cities or incorporated villages of
the first class.7 The sale may be conducted by the sheriff, but the general
practice is to appoint a referee for the purpose.8
'That most ingenious advocate, Mr. Ephraim Tutt, recently foiled a covetous mort-
gagee, to the great satisfaction of the reader, in Mr. Arthur Train's story, "A Leaf
from King John", which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post for July 18, 1936.
IN. Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT (1920) §§ 986, 1082. This statute is hreafter cited as
C.P.A.
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. RULE 256.
'C.P.A. § 1082.
"C.P.A. § 986.
OC.P.A. § 712.
"C.P.A. § 986. The newspaper advertising must appear once a week if published for
six weeks, or twice a week for three weeks, if one newspaper. In New York and
Kings Counties, however, publication must be in two such daily papers. Public
posting of the notice of sale is also required in certain cases. See C.P.A. §H 712
and 986.
"This paper does not attempt to discuss foreclosures by advertisement and sale
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The theory of the public auction is that the owner of a substantial equity
is thus assured of having its value returned to him as "surplus moneys", or
at worst, that in case the competitive bidding for the property fails to bring a
price equal to the debt and costs, it will at any rate fix the true value of the
mortgaged realty and so limit to a just amount any deficiency judgment
which may be entered. However, both these results can be obtained only where
there are actual competing bids at the sale; and actual bidding at a foreclosure
sale today is very rare.9 The mortgagee has ordinarily used every resource
to encourage the debtor to keep up his interest and taxes, and comes to fore-
closure only when the case is hopeless. The great lending institutions are
reluctant to load themselves with foreclosed real estate; but the debtor who
is unable to keep up his taxes and interest is generally without friends who
have the money to bid in the property on the courthouse steps. If he has the
friends, they ordinarily come to his aid before the foreclosure is started. As
a result, the "auction" is very often attended only by the referee and by the
plaintiff's attorney, who patiently waits until the terms of sale are read and
then buys the property without competition.
A person not learned in the law who enters a county courthouse at ten
or eleven o'clock in the morning must be puzzled by the transactions on the
steps or in the front vestibule. He will see anywhere from one to a dozen
or more young men, each reading in a drone from a little printed strip of paper.
No one listens to their words. From time to time one of the readers stops,
whereupon an officious bystander speaks to him in a low tone and gets his
signature on a printed blank. The reader walks away. Quite possibly the
curious layman would be surprised to be told that he was seeing an auction,
and that the young men reading from little slips of paper are referees, ap-
pointed by the Supreme or County Court to sell foreclosed lands; that the
only bidding is the mention of the price by the mortgagee's attorney, which
is followed immediately by the signature of a memorandum of sale by the
referee. After watching a few of these transactions, the layman begins to doubt
whether any good purpose is served by requiring the holder of a defaulted
mortgage to pay a referee to compute the amount already admitted to be
due by the defendant's failure to answer; and by requiring him to pay a
newspaper for publishing an advertisement of the sale, and to pay a referee
without action under Article 17 of the N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW. The pro-
cedure is rigid and technical, and so liable to produce defective titles. Hence it is
little used. See 1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed.) § 33. One of the
senior members of the Rochester Bar is regarded with some awe because he is
supposed once to have conducted such a foreclosure!9There is no way in which statistics can be compiled on the number of foreclosure
sales at which the plaintiff has been the only bidder. I think most lawyers who
see much of foreclosures will agree that this has occurred in the great majority of
cases in the last few years. The very small number of sales in which surplus moneys
are produced (discussed later in this paper) confirms this impression.
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to go through the motions of an auction, when everyone concerned knows
that the net result will be the acquisition of title by the creditor.
Large lending institutions such as savings banks and insurance companies
are required by statute in New York to lend only such portion of the value
of mortgaged realty as will leave a substantial equity.10 If the statutory
requirement of advertisement and sale is performing any useful function, in
the thousands of foreclosure sales held in this state in the past two or three
years" there should have been many instances in which the bidding produced
a surplus over the mortgage debt and costs. On the contrary, however, the
general experience of lawyers and such statistics as can be found alike in-
dicate that surplus moneys are almost non-existent. In Monroe County12
there were 1266 foreclosure sales in 1934, 2312 in 1935, and 1285 in the
first eight months of 1936. Of these 4863 sales, only six produced surplus
moneys. 13 There is no reason to suppose that bidders are any more eager in
"A savings bank may lend to the extent of sixty per cent of the appraised value
of the realty. BANKING LAW § 239-6. Commercial Banks may lend two-thirds of
the .appraised value. BANKING LAW § 108-4 (a). Trust Companies may lend up
to sixty per cent. BANKING LAW § 193. Savings and Loan Associations may lend
eighty per cent of the appraised value of improved realty. BANKING LAW § 386-5.
Insurance Companies may lend on real security "worth fifty per centum more than
the amount loaned thereon." INsuRANcE LAW § 16.
'Statistics on this subject are hard to find. The Judicial Council is not as yet
compiling figures on the number of foreclosure actions in Supreme and County courts.
Through the courtesy of Mr. Roy F. Bush, Monroe County Clerk, and several of his
assistants, I have been able, however, to consult reports from that office submitted to the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and have had the operation of certain of the registers
made clear to me. The Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, has obtained reports on the number of foreclosure sales in communities
which contain sixty-four per cent of the population of New York. In these com-
munities there were in recent years the following foreclosures:
1932 .............................................. 18,432
1933 .............................................. 19,903
1934 .............................................. 23,321
1935 .............................................. 25,641
The first four months of 1936 are reported as follows:
January ............................................. 1820
February ........................................... 1789
M arch .............................................. 1953
A pril ............................................... 1997
"Monroe County had at the time of the 1930 census a population of 423,881; it
contains the City of Rochester with a population of 328,132.
'These figures are derived from the Court and Trust Fund Register, kept in the
Monroe County Clerk's office. Whenever a judgment of foreclosure and sale is
entered, a clerk notes in this register the title of the action, the date of the judgment,
and the file references. He makes a special notation in case the action does not
involve the foreclosure of a mortgage. When the referee's report of sale is entered,
an additional notation is made on the register showing whether the report indicates
a deficiency or a surplus, and the amount in case of a surplus. The surplus moneys
in the six instances mentioned, were:
$1440.24
2381.00
165.61
68.23
1017.74
87.14
$5159.96
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other counties. It seems a safe conclusion that advertisement and sale are of
very little use in obtaining for the mortgagor a cash surplus to represent his
foreclosed equity.
The other function of advertisement and public sale-that of fixing the just
amount of the deficiency judgment to be entered-fails of performance be-
cause of the same lack of bidding. The New York emergency mortgage
legislation has recognized this failure and has forbidden the entry of a deficiency
judgment on the foreclosure of a mortgage made before July 1, 1932, unless
the court finds the reasonable market value of the realty to be less than the
debt and costs, permitting in that case a deficiency judgment for the differ-
ence. 14 The legislature very evidently considered that the bidding at the
statutory auction was no just indication of the true worth of the mortgaged
property, and substituted the "emergency" rule to prevent the creditor from
taking by foreclosure property of value equal to the debt and costs and still
entering a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor.' 5 Most foreclosures at
the present time are affected by this legislation.
It is a fair general statement that foreclosure in New York today is only a
means for the mortgagee to acquire title to the mortgaged property, which in
most cases extinguishes the debt. 16 Consequently in some instances the debtor
even maneuvers to drive the creditor to foreclosure, hoping thus to be rid of
In a few instances the entry "no deficiency" occurs; but in the overwhelming
majority of cases the notation indicates that the sale failed to bring a bid equal to
the debt and costs. The register does not give the amount of deficiencies; nor are
these amounts particularly significant. The creditor ordinarily bids some arbitrary
sum, less than the debt, and buys the property in without competition.
The figures representing the total numbers of Monroe County foreclosure sales in
1934, 1935, and the first eight months of 1936 were compiled from the Court and
Trust Fund Register by one of the County Clerk's staff for the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board.
"C.P.A. § 1083 A. Limitation upon deficiency judgments during energency period.
'As the statute limiting the entry of deficiency judgments (C.P.A. § 1083 A) has
no application to any mortgage dated on or after July 1, 1932, foreclosure of recent
mortgages may result in the entry of deficiency judgments for the difference between
the bid and the debt and costs, no matter how inadequate or non-competitive the bid.
A number of such recent mortgages held by the Home Owners Loan Corporation
are now under foreclosure in Monroe County. As these were all made on careful
appraisals, and the amount loaned was supposedly not more than eighty per cent of
the value of the mortgaged land, there should originally have been an equity of at
least twenty-five per cent of the amount of the loan in every case. See HoMnE
OWNERs' LOAN Acr OF 1933, 48 STAT. 128 (1933) c. 64 § 1, 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (d).
Why should the law permit the mortgagee to bid in the premises and still enter a
deficiency judgment where the default of interest and taxes does not exceed twenty-
five per cent of the principal of the mortgage debt, and there is no showing of a
decline in the value of the premises?
"One exception, already discussed, is in the case of mortgages dated on or after
July 1, 1932. Another is found in the rare instance -where the creditor can show
that the property sold did not at a fair valuation equal the debt and other charges.
See C.P.A. § 1083 A. No figures have been collected showing the number of deficiency
judgments entered pursuant to the emergency legislation; my own experience con-
vinces me that they are granted in a very small proportion of foreclosures of mortgages
to which that legislation applies.
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his personal liability before the emergency legislation becomes inoperative. It
seems no unfair summary to say that in the average case the reference to com-
pute and the advertisement and sale perform no useful service to justify their
cost.
This cost is substantial. In Monroe County most foreclosure advertising
is published in the official court newspaper, and costs about $35.00 for six in-
sertions of the average size. Most referees are paid a fee of $50.00 for their
entire services in computing the sum due and in "auctioning off" the property.1
7
If $85.00 is a fair average cost of computation, advertisement, and sale in a
Monroe County foreclosure action, then in the 4863 sales of mortgaged realty
occurring there in 1934, 1935, and the first eight months of 1936, a total of
about $400,000.00 was paid by disappointed mortgagees for referees' fees and
advertising, with no benefit to anyone but the referees and the newspapers. If
the same cost is a fair average throughout the state of New York, then in the
56,521 foreclosure sales occurring in 1934, 1935, and the first four months
of 1936 in the communities reporting to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
representing only sixty-four, per cent of the population of the state, a total of
over four and three-quarters millions of dollars was uselessly spent for referees'
fees and advertising.18 The expense for the entire state must be very riuch
greater ;19 and the anticipation by lending institutions of the delay and expense
of realizing on real security must materially increase the difficulty of obtaining
mortgage loans at reasonable interest rates .throughout the state.
It seems sensible to recognize that in the average case the reference to com-
pute and advertisement and sale impose a burden on the creditor with no
17Where the creditor bids in the property on the foreclosure sale and his bid is
simply credited on the debt, the referee's commissions for sale are limited to $25.00.
C.P.A. § 1546. For "computing the amount due" (i.e., checking over some arithmetic
prepared by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney) the referee is entitled to $25.00.
C.P.A. § 1545.
If the plaintiff were suing on the debtor's unsecured bond, the defendant's failure
to appear or answer would permit the plaintiff to take judgment for the amount
demanded in the complaint with interest and costs, without the intervention of a
referee or judge to make a computation. The plaintiff could then sell the defendant's
realty on execution.
Perhaps the historical difference between procedure at law and in equity accounts
for this difference in the effect of a failure to answer. Whatever its origin, there
seems no good reason today to perpetuate it. Why should a default in pleading be
more conclusive for a debtor who has not mortgaged his house than for one who
has so secured the debt?
"'For the sources of these statistics, see supra notes 11 and 13. If 1933 and 1932
were included, the total expense would be much greater, of course; but the year
1934 was the first in which the number of sales resulting in surplus money was
examined.
By no means forgotten is the fact that in times of great distress referees' fees have
been of great help to many a needy lawyer. What is meant by the useless expenditure
of this money is that it accomplished nothing useful for the parties to-the litigation.
The Bar is not entitled to regard itself as the beneficiary of a special sort of mort-
gage tax.
"The total cost of computation, advertisement, and sale is probably more than
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benefit to the debtor; and we might well so change our foreclosure practice
as to provide a cheap and quick way for the mortgagee to perfect title to the
security without sale, in case he is willing to consider the debt thus satisfied,
and in case the subsequent lienors or the owners of the equity do not consider
that their interests justify an application for a judgment requiring sale.20
To foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff could file a lis pendens and summons
and complaint and serve all persons having an interest in the realty subordinate
to the mortgage under foreclosure. If all defendants defaulted in appear-
ance or pleading, the plaintiff would be entitled immediately to a decree de-
daring that he had complete and perfect title to the mortgaged property and
that the mortgage debt was satisfied. If any defendant considered that the
mortgaged property had surplus value, he would have a right to serve an
answer demanding a sale. To prevent the service of such demands merely
for their nuisance value, the demand should be ineffective unless the answering
defendant posted a surety bond for a moderate sum, to secure the plaintiff
for the cost of the referee's fees, the expense of advertising, and the loss caused
by the delay. No computation would be necessary unless some defendant by
answer questioned the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint. In-
fants, incompetents, or "poor persons", 21 upon a proper showing that a sale
was needed, could obtain an order dispensing with the posting of security. 22
If a plaintiff should consider the value of the premises so small that a defi-
ciency judgment was proper, he should be required to demand a sale in his
complaint, and (as under the present "emergency" statute) should be granted
a deficiency judgment only for
"... an amount equal to the sum of the amount owing by the party
liable as determined by the judgment with interest, plus the amount owing
on all prior liens and encumbrances with interest, plus costs and disburse-
ments of the action including the referee's fee and disbursements, less
the market value as determined by the court or the sale price of the
property whichever shall be the higher." 23
$85.00 in the average case in New York City. See for example the special provisions
of C.P.A. § 986 requiring publication in two daily papers in the counties of New
York and Kings.
='Proposed amended sections of the Civil Practice Act are added as an appendix
at the end of this article.
=C.P.A. §§ 198, 199.
'Of course many interesting questions of detail arise. Liens of the people of the
state for franchise taxes accruing against corporate mortgagors, or for transfer or
estate taxes can be cleared off by a superior mortgagee under C.P.A. §§ 214 and 221.
Under the suggested practice the People presumably ought not to be required to
post a bond to obtain a sale, but if the People demand a sale, they should be required
to pay costs in case the sale produces no bid sufficient to pay the debt and the expenses..
=C.P.A. § 1083 A. The reenactment of this section in permanent form is not a
necessary part of the plan of short foreclosure here advocated, but the section seems
eminently just. This limitation on deficiency judgments would certainly be constitu-
tional as to mortgages made after it was enacted, and should be valid even as to
previous mortgages. Has a mortgagee a vested right in a form of procedure that
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The suggested short form of foreclosure should eliminate most deficiency
judgments. In the great majority of cases, lending institutions would prefer
to acquire title with no delay and with a substantial saving in disbursements
rather than to undergo the expense and delay of advertisement and sale in
the hope that a deficiency judgment could be obtained and collected. Further-
more, examination of the title by subsequent purchasers would be simplified.
Where the short form was used, the examiner would be spared the duty of
inspecting the proofs of posting and the referee's report of sale to make sure
that the rigid requirements of the statute were carried out. The work of the
attorney conducting the foreclosure action would be much lightened, and
perhaps the cost of his services to his client thus diminished. Delay, uncer-
tainty, cost-these are the layman's most persistent criticisms of legal proce-
dure. All three defects would be improved by the suggested amendment.
II
For at least a century and three quarters, foreclosure with sale under judi-
cial decree and strict foreclosure have existed side by side under the New
York law, although, since the adoption of Part II of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure in 1880, foreclosure without sale has been available only
"in an action brought to foreclose or extinguish a right of redemption,
in which action the judgment, instead of directing a sale of the property,
shall fix the time within which such property shall be redeemed by a
person having or claiming the right to redeem or foreclose a second or
subsequent mortgage or lien that has been matured for at least five years
and shall provide that a.failure to redeem or commence an action for the
foreclosure of such mortgage or lien within such time, shall preclude such
mortgagee or lienor from redeeming such property or foreclosing such
mortgage or lien and thereafter such mortgagee or lienor shall be excluded
from claiming any title or interest in such property and all title and interest
of such mortgagee or lienor in such property shall thereby be extinguished
and terminated." 25
pays the same debt twice? Loporto v. Druiss Co. 268 N. Y. 699 (1935), 269 N. Y.
677 (1936); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
'Failure to comply strictly with the requirements of the statutes as to posting
and publication of notice of sale may give the mortgagee who buys in the premises
a defective title. Bechstein v. Schultz, 120 N. Y. 168 (1890) ; Pawlak v. Gruszecki,
124 Misc. 447 (Sup. Ct. 1925); City of Albany v. Goodman, 203 App. Div. 530 (3d
Dept. 1922).
-C.P.A. § 1082. The suggestion has been made that strict foreclosure fell into
disfavor because, out 'of tender regard for debtors, judges, would keep extending
from one six-months' period to another the time within which the debtor might pay
off the mortgage. Similar postponement of sales appears to have been not so readily
obtainable. See 2 VAN SANTV06RD, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK IN EQUITY ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
(2d ed. 1862) c. 2, p. 71.
The exact limits of the right to foreclose a right to redeem without sale under
C.P.A. § 1082 are not entirely clear. This practice may be convenient where in an
ordinary foreclosure and sale a defective title has been created because necessary
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Foreclosure with sale was recognized and regulated by statute as early as
1760 in the Colony of New York. An act passed November 8 of that year 26
provided for service of process on absentee mortgagors by publication, and
also regulated the subsequent proceedings in the action. If the defendant
mortgagor failed to appear after the publication of an order for his appearance
in a newspaper, and after posting for three Sundays at the defendant's parish
church,
".... then on proof made of the publication of such order in manner
aforesaid the court may order the previous bill to be taken pro confeso
and thereupon decree a sale of the mortgaged premises or any part or
parts thereof as to the court shall seem just and right."
The statute provides for the appointment of two appraisers to inform the
court as to the true value of the premises, and for a sale by the sheriff after
advertisement in one or more newspapers once a week for six months. The
statute directs the sheriff to make a deed of the premises to the purchaser,
which will convey the same title as a deed made by the mortgagor and mort-
gagee.2 7 Thus with minor differences, the present method of foreclosure and
sale was in use (at least in cases of absentees) in New York a century and
three quarters ago. It is noteworthy, however, that the form of the language
providing for a sale is permissive and not mandatory, and strict foreclosure
presumably existed as an alternative remedy.28
By an Act of December 24, 1767, the statute just described was continued
in effect until 1780.29 In 1785, the legislature of the new State enacted a
similar statute, with the time of publication of the notice of sale shortened to
six weeks.8 0 In 1787, the requirement that two appraisers be appointed was
dropped.81 The statute recites the previous requirements, and continues:
".. -and whereas it is found by experience that in most cases the
causing of the mortgaged premises to be appraised in manner aforesaid
before any decree shall be made is attended with delay and considerable
expense and no valuable purpose answered thereby; therefore BE IT
ENACTED by the people of the State of New York . . . that it shall
and may be lawful for the Chancellor to decree and order a sale of any
such mortgaged premises in pursuance of said act without any such
appraisal as aforesaid in such cases where he shall judge the same to
be necessary; .. . "
parties have been omitted. See WILTsIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE (4th ed.) § 32;
Benedict v. Gilman, 4 Paige Ch. 58 (N. Y. 1833); Kendall v. Treadwell, 14 How.
Pr. 165 (N. Y. 1857).
:"An Act for making process in courts of equity effective against mortgagors who
abscond and cannot be served therewith or who refuse to appear." 3 COLONIAL LAws
OF NEw YORK (Lyon, 1894) p. 494.
'See C.P.A. § 1085.
"See 2 VAN SANTVO6RD, op. cit. supra note 25, c. 2, p. 71.
13 COLONIAL LAWS oF NEW YORK (Lyon, 1894) p. 957.
'GREENLEAF, LAws OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2d ed. 1798) c. 27, p. 157.
3Id. at 406.
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The form of this act, like its predecessors, seems to authorize the Chancellor
to order a sale or not, as he deems fit. Of course it would be difficult to
determine the proportion of cases in which the court determined that a sale
was unnecessary.
The enactments just referred to were all in terms directed only to cases of
absentee defendants. In 1801, however, the Legislature, in a general statute
regulating chancery practice,8 2 provided for mortgage foreclosure sales by
masters, although sales were not expressly made mandatory. In 1813, chancery
practice was again revised and the statute of 1801 was reenacted with little
change, and without expressly requiring a sale.38
The Revised Statutes of 182984 contain language which seems to empower
the court to decree a sale as if this were an exception to the normal course.
"Whenever a bill shall be filed for the foreclosure or satisfaction of a
mortgage the court shall have power to decree a sale of the mortgaged
premises or such part thereof as may be sufficient to discharge the amount
due on the mortgage and the costs of suit."
On the other hand, Rule 135 of the Rules and Orders of the Court of Chancery,
as revised by Chancellor Walworth in 1837 and 1840,35 contains language
2
"An Act concerning the Court of Chancery and the Proceedings therein", passed
April 3, 1801: 1 KENT & RADCLIFFE, LAWS OF NEW YORK c. 33, p. 439.
'1 VAN NESS AND WOODWORTH, REVISED LAWS OF NEW YORK (1813) p. 486.
12 N. Y. REV. STAT. (1st ed. 1829) part III, c. 1, art. 6, § 151, p. 191: "Of the
Powers and Proceedings of the Court upon Bills for the Foreclosure or Satisfaction
of Mortgages."
"The financial crisis of 1837 and the readjustment that followed it produced some
interesting experiments in New York foreclosure procedure. N. Y. Laws 1837, c. 410,
passed May 12, gave to any mortgagor of real or leasehold estate one year from the
date of sale under foreclosure to redeem by paying the judgment debt with interest
at the rate of 10% per annum. Within a year of the date of this statute its incon-
venience had become apparent, and it was repealed by N. Y. Laws 1838, c. 266, passed
April 18 to take effect November 1, 1838.
By 1840 the advantages of facilitating liquidation had appeared, and on May 14 of
that year the legislature passed N. Y. Laws 1840, c. 342, entitled "An Act to reduce
the expense of foreclosing mortgages in the court of chancery." By this statute the
Chancellor was directed to devise short forms for bills, the taxable costs were rigidly
restricted, and calendar practice on defaults was eliminated. The complainant was
directed to file with his bill a notice of pendency containing statements like those in
use today. Then there occurred a provision cutting off the rights of inferior mort-
gagees and other lienors without their being made parties to the foreclosure:
"§ 9. It shall not be necessary that any person having a lien by any judgment
or decree'upon the land contained in any mortgage subsequent to such mortgage,
or any person having any lien or claim by or under such subsequent judgment
or decree, be made a party to the suit for the foreclosure thereof; and every
decree of foreclosure and sale of lands mortgaged, shall bar and foreclose all
claim and equity of redemption of every person having such subsequent judgment
or decree, and his heirs and personal representatives, and of all persons claiming
under him or them, subject to the provisions of the subsequent sections of this
act; but no such decree shall be made, unless proof shall be given in such manner
as shall be required by the court, that notice of the pendency of the suit has been
filed as is required in the next preceding section, for at least forty days before
such decree shall be made."
The unhappy subsequent lienor was allowed to participate in any surplus moneys,
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indicating that by that time sale had become the rule, although the court
might dispense with it:
and unless otherwise specially ordered by the court, the decree
shall direct that the mortgaged premises, or so much thereof as may be
sufficient to raise the amount due to the complainant for principal, in-
terest and costs, and which may be sold separately without material injury
to the parties interested, be sold by or under the direction of a
master. .... 36
The adoption of the Code of Procedure, which took effect in 1848, did not,
alter the procedure in foreclosures. Van Santvoord, writing of practice under
the Code in 1862, said :3
c... though the strict foreclosure, no doubt, still exists as an equitable
remedy, if the parties choose to ask, or the court thinks proper to allow
it, yet it is rarely resorted to in this State ... the statutory remedy of a
judgment for a sale of the mortgaged premises to satisfy the mortgage,
and costs being almost invariably adopted."38
The enactment in 1880 of Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure for the first
time made mandatory a judgment of sale in the ordinary mortgage fore-
closure.39 Section 1626 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided:
even though not a party to the foreclosure.
Evidently the procedure was considered too harsh, for by an Act of May 14, 1844
(N. Y. Laws 1844, c. 346, § 5), the provision for cutting off subsequent lienors
without joining them as parties was repealed. Probably by that time most of the
defaulted mortgages of the 1837 depression had been foreclosed.
'Cf. N. Y. Crv. PpAc. RULE 259.
'2 Van Santvoird, op. cit. supra note 25, c. 2, p. 71.
'Kendall v. Treadwell, 14 How. Pr. 165 (N. Y. 1857), is an interesting example
of the use of strict foreclosure to correct defects in a previous foreclosure and sale.
The plaintiff mortgagee had bought in the land in a County Court foreclosure sale,
and had made repairs and improvements. The decision of the General Term in Hall
v. Nelson, 14 How. Pr. 32 (N. Y. 1856) threw doubt on the jurisdiction of the
County Court, and thereupon the plaintiff brought this action for strict foreclosure.
No defendant appeared, but the Court wrote a studied opinion stating that such fore-
closures would probably be numerous and that the form of judgment to be entered
should therefore be considered with care. The opinion required that the judgment
provide that, unless some defendant gave the plantiff notice of intention and an
agreement to redeem within ten days after judgment, all defendants should be barred
and foreclosed and the plaintiff should have the mortgaged premises in full payment
of 1he debt. If any defendant should give such notice and pay to the plaintiff the
debt, costs, and the value of the improvements, then the premises should be sold
and the proceeds should be distributed among the subsequent lienors according to
their priorities.
The procedure outlined in that judgment is interestingly similar to that suggested
in this paper as desirable today. In each the premises are strictly foreclosed without
sale unless some defendant takes timely steps to procure a sale and to protect the
plaintiff against its costs. The practice in the Kendall case is harder on the defendant.
There, to procure a sale, he has to pay the mortgage debt and costs; while this paper
suggests only that he be required to post a bond to secure to the plaintiff the expense
of sale and damages because of the delay. In both procedures the debt is satisfied
if the plaintiff is awarded the premises by strict foreclosure. Similarly in Benedict
v. Gilman, 4 Paige Ch. 58 (N. Y. 1833), the opinion directed that, in case the
redemption period of thirty days passed and the plaintiff acquired absolute title to
the land, he was to have no costs against the defendants.
'N. Y. Laws 1880, c. 178.
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"In an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real property, if the plain-
tiff becomes entitled to final judgment, it must direct the sale of the
property mortgaged or of such part thereof as is sufficient to discharge
the mortgage debt, the expenses of the sale and the costs of the action."
This is the language of the first clause of Section 1082 of the present Civil
Practice Act, which today requires a sale in every mortgage foreclosure ex-
cept in the rare case of a foreclosure to extinguish a right of redemption.
III
England has never gone as far as New York in requiring a sale in every
ordinary foreclosure action. The practice there permits the court to
order a sale or grant strict foreclosure as appears necessary or expedient.40
The discretion given to the court to order a sale instead of strict foreclosure
must be exercised judicially,41 and the court may require appropriate security
to be posted to cover the cost of sale.42
Of course, it is difficult for a New York lawyer to get the feeling of the
English practice. While it affords the principal advantage of the procedure sug-
gested for New York by eliminating the sale entirely when that course ap-
pears necessary or expedient, it appears to open the door to disputes of some
length as to what is necessary or expedient in a given case. The practice here
suggested eliminates the uncertainty, for the mortgagee would have an
absolute right to strict foreclosure unless a defendant demanded a sale and
posted security or had it dispensed with, in which event the defendant's right
to sale would be absolute.
IV
One of the commonest criticisms directed at the law and lawyers is that
they are both continuously out of date. There is a measure of truth in this
criticism as applied to our law of mortgages; and there is good reason to ques-
tion whether a practice developed in an era when a great portion of our popu-
lation lived in large families on farm homesteads is appropriate to a time of
transient ownership of small dwellings on subdivision lots, when the owner''
ability to get a "bank loan" on his house is a necessary prerequisite to own-
ership. No favor is done the house owner by putting unnecessary difficulty
"oWILSON, PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (7th ed. 1888) p. 382;
21 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1912) p. 284.
'"Merchant Banking Co. v. London and Hanseatic Bank, 55 L. J. Ch. 479, 480 (1886).
"Wooley v. Colman, 21 Ch. D. 169 (1882). Here the plaintiff was required to
secure the costs although the defendants had asked the sale to protect their interests.
It appears more sensible to require the party who is asking the sale because he supposes
that the land has surplus value, to give security to pay for the trouble he has caused
in case at the sale no bid is made sufficient to pay the claims of the plaintiff and
the costs of sale.
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in the way of the lender who wants to foreclose his mortgage: it only increases
the cost of carrying the loan and makes refinancing harder.
The legislation suggested in this paper would merely permit the interest of
the owner to be foreclosed in the same way now available for cutting off rights
of redemption, which may well be quite as valuable as the owner's equity.
This would be a business-like improvement in our law.
APPENDIX
43
Suggested Amendments to New York Civil Practice Act
Matter in italics is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old law to be omitted.
§ 1077E. Application to Pending Actions. . . . If such action or pro-
ceeding has not proceded to final judgment [directing the sale of the
mortgaged premises] then such action shall be dismissed . . .
§ 1079B. (New Section.) Demand for Sale and Security. In any action
to foreclose a mortgage upon real property any party in his pleading may
demand that the judgment of foreclosure require a sale of the mortgaged
premises; provided that no such demand on a defendant's behalf shall be
of any effect unless such defendant before serving his pleading shall file with
the Clerk his bond with two sufficient sureties in the sum of $250.00, con-
ditioned for the payment of the costs, fees and expenses of advertisement and
sale and any damage the plaintiff may suffer by reason of the delay incidental
thereto in case the proceeds on the sale shall be insufficient to equal the sum
of the amount owing by the party liable as determined by the judgment, with
interest, plus the amount owing on all prior liens and encumbrances with in-
terest, plus costs and disbursements of the action including the referee's fees
and disbursements. Such defendant shall serve a copy of his bond with his
pleading. The court shall have power by order, made upon notice, to dispense
with such security in the case of an infant, an incompetent, or a poor person
as defined in § 199 of the Civil Practice Act, upon a showing to the satis-
faction of the court that there is reasonable ground to believe that bids will
be made on the sale equal to or in excess of the sum needed as defined in this
section. The court upon a proper showing shall have power to require a bond
in excess of $250.00.
§ 1080. Notice of pendency of action to be filed. The plaintiff, at least
twenty days before a final judgment [directing a sale] is rendered, must file
in the clerk's office ...
§ 1081. When complaint to be dismissed on payment of sum due ...
upon the defendant paying into court, at any time before a final judgmenf
[directing a sale] is rendered, the sum due and the plaintiff's costs.§ 1082. Final judgment [must direct sale]. In an action to foreclose. a
mortgage upon real property, if the plaintiff becomes entitled to final judg-
ment, [it] in case a sale has been demanded in the pleadings and security
posted where required or dispensed with as provided in § 1079B, the judg-
ment must direct the sale .... In case of the death, disability, or removal of
'In drawing the suggested amendments to the Civil Practice Act and Rules, every
effort has been made to make the judgment of foreclosure without sale the practical
equivalent of the present referee's deed. Hence provision is made for including in
such a judgment the essential features of such a conveyance.
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the officer appointed to conduct the sale of the premises, the court may grant
an order authorizing the bank or trust company in which such surplus
moneys are deposited to pay them over to the person or persons entitled
thereto.
In case no party has become entitled to require a sale by demand and by
posting security when required, the final judgment shall provide that the in-
terests of all defendants having interests in the mortgaged premises subse-
quent to the mortgage under foreclosure, who shall be named in said judg-
ment or sufficientlv described therein if their names be unknown, shall
'thereby be extinguished and terminated, and that the indebtedness secured
by the mortgage shlvl be deemed entirely satisfied and discharged. Every
such judgment of foreclosure without sale shall be recorded in the same
manner as a deed and indexed in the name of the last record owner as grantor
and in the name of the plaintiff as grantee.
§ 1083A. Limitation upon deficiency judgments [during emergency
period]. No judgment shall be granted for any residue of the debt remaining
unsatisfied as prescribed by the preceding section [where an action to fore-
close the mortgage has been or shall be commenced during the emergency or
where the mortgaged property shall be sold during the emergency] except
as herein provided....
§ 1086. Sale where mortgage debt is not all due. Where the mortgage
debt is not all due ... the final judgment if it direct a sale, must direct....
The plaintiff may apply ... as often as a default happens. If it appears that
the mortgaged property is so circumstanced that a sale of the whole will be
most beneficial to the parties, in case a sale has been demanded in the plead-
ings and security posted where required or dispensed with as provided in
§ 1079B, the final judgment may direct ...
Suggested Amendments to Rules of Civil Practice
Rule 256. Reference on default or admission. If, in an action to foreclose
a mortgage any defendant be an infant, an incompetent, or an absentee [the
defendant fail to answer within the time allowed for that purpose, or the
right of the plaintiff, as stated in the complaint, is admitted by the answer]
unless the court shall ascertain and determine the amount due, the plaintiff
may have an order referring it to some suitable person ....... and to com-
pute the amount due on the mortgage preparatory to the application for judg-
ment [of foreclosure and sale].
Rule 259. Contents of judgment in foreclosure action [of sale]. In every
judgment for the sale or foreclosure without sale of mortgaged premises, the
description and particular boundaries of the property to be sold or foreclosed
without sale, so far as the same can be ascertained . . . shall be inserted.
Where the judgment directs a sale, it shall, unless otherwise specially ordered
by the court [the judgment shall] direct that the mortgaged premises ....
Rule 266. Mortgage and assignments to be filed or recorded before con-
veyance or judgment of foreclosure without sale. Whenever a sheriff or
referee sells mortgaged premises under a decree, order, or judgment of the
court, or whenever a judgment of foreclosure without sale is entered it shall
be the duty of the plaintiff before the entry of the judgment of foreclosure
without sale or before a deed is executed to the purchaser, to file such mort-
gage... in the county or counties where the lands so sold or foreclosed with-
out sale are situated before a deed is executed to the purchaser on the sale
or before the judgment of foreclosure without sale is entered; . . .
